

STAT

June 12, 1968

SUBJECT: Politico-Military Game MU I-68 - Film and Commentary

1. The following personnel have indicated their desire to attend subject event scheduled for June 27, 1968, from 1330 to 1500, in Room 5 C-1042, the Pentagon:

- Chief, NE Division, DDP
- Member, Bd of National Estimates
- Chief, OCI/CA/MEA

2. The Joint War Games Agency, JCS, has received acceptances for attendance at the subject event from the following officials:

The Hon. Joseph W. Barr - Under Sec. of Treasury

The Hon. Paul C. Warnke - Asst Sec. of Def. for ISA

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer - CNO

Gen. Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. - Commandant, USMC

Lt.Gen.Marshall S.Carter - Director, NSA

**JCS review(s)  
completed.**

CIA Liaison for Games & Exercises

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(EXECUTIVE REPORT FILE

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MEMORANDUM FOR: *Ex 1. Assnt.*

*How about shopping  
this with BNE, DDI and  
DDP for interest?*

*Off hand I would  
think a BNE rep. and  
perhaps Jim Pitchfield  
would be appropriate.*



*6/5/68*  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)



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Executive Registry  
168-1681/3

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

5 JUN 1968

Dear Dick,

You and one or two key members of your staff are cordially invited to join with me to review a video summary and commentary of MU I-68. This was an interagency, politico-military game dealing with emerging trends in the Middle East and their impact upon United States foreign policy and objectives in a near time frame. The review will be presented from 1330 to 1500 hours on Thursday, 27 June, in Room 5C-1042, the Pentagon. Those individuals listed in the enclosure have also been invited to attend.

I look forward to your personal review of this film briefing and to your participation in the ensuing discussion. An opportunity to share your views concerning this critical region would substantially enhance the value of the review to all in attendance. The atmosphere will be informal and a policy of non-attribution will be rigidly observed.

The Joint War Games Agency point of contact is Lt Colonel Lyle E. Mann, USAF, OXford 5-7683, to whom your attendance may be confirmed.

Sincerely,

*Bles*

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure  
a/s

The Honorable Richard M. Helms  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

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LIST OF ADDRESSEES

The Honorable  
Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

The Honorable  
Dean Rusk  
The Secretary of State  
The Department of State  
Washington, D. C. 20520

The Honorable  
William C. Foster  
Director, United States Arms Control  
and Disarmament Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20451

The Honorable  
William S. Gaud  
Administrator, Agency for International  
Development  
Washington, D. C. 20523

The Honorable  
Joseph W. Barr  
The Under Secretary of the Treasury  
The Treasury Department  
Washington, D. C. 20220

The Honorable  
Richard M. Helms  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

The Honorable  
Leonard H. Marks  
Director, United States Information  
Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20547

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The Honorable  
Paul C. Warnke  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for International Security Affairs  
The Department of Defense  
Washington, D. C. 20301

The Honorable  
Phil G. Goulding  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs  
The Department of Defense  
Washington, D. C. 20301

General Harold K. Johnson  
Chief of Staff  
United States Army  
Washington, D. C. 20301

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer  
Chief of Naval Operations  
United States Navy  
Washington, D. C. 20301

General John P. McConnell  
Chief of Staff  
United States Air Force  
Washington, D. C. 20301

General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.  
Commandant  
United States Marine Corps  
Washington, D. C. 20301

General Theodore J. Conway, USA  
Commander in Chief  
United States Strike Command  
MacDill AFB, Florida 33608

Admiral Ephraim P. Holmes, USN  
Commander in Chief, Atlantic  
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA  
Director, National Security Agency  
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755  
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**MEMORANDUM**

Date 15 May 1968

To: Exer-Dir

Subject: MU I-68

Enclosed is a brief summary and commentary on a politico-military game conducted in the Pentagon from 26 April to 14 May. The game was directed by Mr. Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and addressed problems this nation faces in the Middle East.



W. H. BIRDSONG  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief, Joint War Games Agency

Attachment  
a/s (S-NF)

GROUP-3  
Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
Not automatically declassified.

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# POLITICO-MILITARY GAME

## MU I-68

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Conducted on an interagency basis by the Joint War Games Agency, OJCS.  
Written Final Report and 25-minute Film Summary available 15 June 1968.

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INITIAL SETTING: 29 April 1969 - US troop commitments in Vietnam remain heavy - Soviet influence in Middle East grows - Arab armies rebuilt to pre-June '67 levels.

Terrorist activities abate in Jordan Valley in summer '68 - Fatah leaders, with grave reservations, agree to let negotiations begin on Rhodes - talks achieve initial success in forging agreement between Israel and the UAR leading to opening of Suez Canal - make little further progress - terrorist leaders become restive.

In March 1969, terrorism festers again as band hits Shemona from bases in Lebanon - Israel threatens counteraction - Israeli freighter denied passage of canal on 27 April.

RESULTING CRISIS: Fatah agents liberate and arm 1500 Arab prisoners - 300 Israelis killed as Arabs escape into Jordan - on 28 April, four Israeli brigades push into Irbid Heights in reprisal.

Israel expands salient south to Salt - ten miles from Amman - determines to retain newly gained territory as buffer to terrorism - asks US not to interfere in UN.

US informs Israel unable to support invasion - votes condemnation of Israel in Security Council - urges Israel to withdraw.

Arabs feel climate of world opinion favorable - USSR will support Arabs - US will not support Israel - common threat drives Arabs to unity of action - resolve to mount combined and concerted counter-attack to repel Israelis - USSR counsels Arabs against military action and exerts political pressures to bring about cease-fire and Israeli withdrawal.

Arabs launch attack two days early as original plans for 10 May leak - pre-empt against Israeli air assets - achieve considerable success - destroy all but three days of aviation fuel - Israelis hurl back Arab ground thrust - march on Amman and Damascus.

US and USSR see their respective clients threatened - domestic pressures mount on US Administration to help Israel - US offers air cover if Israel agrees to cease-fire and withdrawal - as a political move, USSR lands two battalions of naval infantry at Latakia.

Cease-fire imposed - Arabs and Israelis move to negotiations on Rhodes - initial round produces some grounds for agreement but status of Jerusalem still a crunch point.

CRITIQUE HIGHLIGHTS: US players felt relatively aloof stance regarding Israeli realistic - took account of American political realities - felt Israelis would be tough to handle - decided to be tough also - wanted to avoid confrontation with Soviets - rejected military intervention not because of lack of assets, but because they couldn't see what it would buy them.

Israeli team members felt most objectives achieved - didn't cave to any great extent on negotiating issues - could afford to give up on face-to-face talks to gain US support - estimated that pre-emption would be more costly than June '67 - Israel could weather Arab pre-emption - felt loss of air assets might force US support.

Arab players felt unity of action realistic - Arabs had no place to go - people demanded action - even a loss would not be damaging if Arab forces at least made a stand - recognized that fissures might appear if conflict protracted.

Soviet team viewed behavior of clients as irritating - but Soviets had to support Arabs so as not to lose them - privately, team did not want Israel to go down - presence of Israel serves their purposes.


Change in balance of power - even a limited Arab victory - would alter negotiating demands of both sides - US and USSR both recognized requirement might exist to impose a settlement - both preferred such action be more multilateral - Soviets, under pressure of crisis, would cooperate initially - but then seek renewal of turbulence.

US and USSR teams both feared confrontation - tended to overrate each other's military potential in the Middle East - US constrained by effects intervention might have on US interests in the Arab states.

Game seemed to ask anew two questions - is there real danger of US/ USSR confrontation in the Middle East or is it possible to negotiate a settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict?



**SECRET**



19 APR 1968

*we don't have  
a copy of 1681.*

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Joint War Games Agency, OJCS**

**SUBJECT: CIA Participation in MU I-68**

1. The following officers have been nominated to participate as  
players in MU I-68:

25X1



2. All of the above-named officers have TOP SECRET security  
clearances.

**FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:**

SECRET

*Sign*



25X1

cc: Ex. Asst/DDCI

**SECRET**

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

*C-7.10*

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**Remarks:**

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FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

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# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM:

MPS/PSG  
Room 2C32

EXTENSION

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DATE

19 April 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Ex. Asst/DDCI  
Room 7D5615

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